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ABSTRACT 
 
We estimate an aggregate daily water demand for Sydney using rainfall, temperature, 
and price data for the period 1994-2005. The estimated demand is used to calculate 
the difference in Marshallian surplus between using the metered price of household 
water to regulate total consumption in Sydney versus mandatory water restrictions for 
the period 2004/2005. Using a choke price of $5.05/kL for outdoor water demand, 
equal to the levelised cost of supplying and storing rainwater in a household water 
tank, we calculate the loss in Marshallian surplus from using mandatory water 
restrictions to be $235 million for the period 1 June 2004 to 1 June 2005. On a per 
capita basis this equates to approximately $55 per person or about $150 per household 
— a little less than half the average Sydney household water bill in 2005.  
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I Introduction 
 
Most Australians must comply with mandatory water restrictions in one form or another.  Unlike 
previous restrictions implemented for relatively short periods of time, the existing regulations have 
been in place for several years in many urban centres. Unless there is above normal rainfall for an 
extended period of time such restrictions are likely to continue for years to come. Indeed, despite a 
substantial increase in the water storage in Sydney from 34 per cent of capacity in February 2007 to 
60 per cent in September 2007 there has been no change in the mandatory Level 3 restrictions that 
have been in place since June 2005.1 
 
The ‘big dry’ that has affected south-east Australia since 2001 has reduced the water in storage in 
many locations and at least 75% of Australians now live with mandatory water restrictions.2 It is 
surprising, therefore, there has been no published demand-based analysis that measures the welfare 
cost of mandatory water restrictions in Australian cities. We address this research need by 
measuring the loss in Marshallian surplus associated with mandatory water restrictions in Sydney 
over the period 2004/2005. Our results for Sydney show that raising the volumetric price of water 
charged to households to achieve the same level of consumption would generate a much higher 
Marshallian surplus than the use of mandatory water restrictions.  
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section II we review the existing studies from Australia and 
internationally that have tried to estimate the welfare losses associated with water rationing. Section 
III presents our estimates of an aggregate per capita daily water demand for Sydney. In Section IV 
we describe how we calculate the difference in Marshallian surplus from using a market-clearing 
price versus water restrictions, provide sensitivity analysis about the estimates, and give a brief 
discussion about the implications of the results. Section V offers concluding remarks.  
 
II Background 
(i) Prices versus Rationing 
Rationing a scarce good equally among all consumers is not economically efficient if consumers 
are heterogeneous and have different marginal valuations for the good in question. Even if 
consumers are identical, rationing can still be inefficient if the good has different uses and at least 
one use is restricted such that marginal values differ across uses. Although water utilities are aware 
of the economic inefficiencies of rationing, they have frequently chosen to ration water in terms of 
when it is supplied, and how it is used, in times of low supplies.  
 
The justification for rationing water versus charging a higher volumetric price is threefold. First, if 
water is considered a basic need then allocating it on the basis of price, especially if demand is 
price inelastic, may be inequitable because it can place a large cost burden on poorer and larger 
households. Second, in some communities, especially in poor countries, household water 
consumption is not metered. Thus raising the water price in the form of a fixed charge provides no 
financial incentive to consumers to reduce their demand. Third, even when households are metered 
and are charged a volumetric price for their water the billing period is such (usually quarterly) that 
if an immediate and temporary reduction in demand is required, it may be more effective to 
implement a rationing scheme rather than raise the price.  
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These justifications for using water restrictions versus a higher volumetric price to reduce 
consumption are not valid, at least for most of metropolitan Australia in the 21st century. In terms 
of equity considerations, average water and waste water bills account for less than one per cent 
household income (Sydney Water 2000, p. 92). There also exists a well-developed welfare system 
in Australia to support disadvantaged households that could be supplemented with lump-sum 
rebates or other means (Grafton and Kompas 2007) to offset increases in water prices. A free or 
low cost allocation of water could also be provided to all or only to disadvantaged households to 
meet basic needs — estimated by the World Health Organisation to be 50 litres per day per person 
(Madden and Carmichael 2007, p. 268).3  
 
Unlike many poor countries, most metropolitan households in Australia do have water meters, 
although Hobart is a notable exception. In multi-dwelling buildings occupiers are generally not  
individually metered, but frequently pay a pro rata water charge based on the area of their units.4 
Despite these exceptions, higher volumetric prices would provide incentives to most Australian 
households to reduce water consumption. Finally, current water restrictions do not appear to be 
temporary phenomena in urban Australia. Indeed, millions of Australians have been subject to 
water restrictions in some form or another for several years with little prospect that this will change 
in the near future. 
(ii) International Studies  
Despite the potential welfare effects of household water restrictions there have been surprisingly 
few studies that have compared the use of volumetric prices versus water rationing. Only two 
studies have calculated the actual costs of water interruptions as a form of rationing — in Seville, 
Spain (Garcia-Valinas 2006) and Hong Kong (Woo 1994). Both studies found that the use of water 
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interruptions is inefficient versus raising the price of water to households. Using data from 
California, Timmins (2003) compared the effects of a water tax on ground flow use to the 
imposition of mandatory low-flow appliances (such as low flush toilets and showers). He found 
that a tax was, in almost all cases, a more cost-effective instrument and would generate a higher 
social surplus.  
 
One of the earliest empirical studies on water prices and droughts was by Moncur (1987). He used 
Hawaiian data to show that a volumetric price could serve as the primary means to reduce demand 
during a drought. Renwick and Archibald (1998) used data from California to compare the 
distributional effects of different approaches to water conservation including: increased prices; bans 
on irrigation use except hand-held devices and drip systems; rebates for low-flow toilets; and an 
allocation scheme that would provide a low base amount to households coupled with a charge for 
use above this quantity. They found that both price and non-price approaches reduced water 
consumption, but did not compare the welfare costs of the different approaches. In a follow up 
study, Renwick and Green (2000) concluded that moderate reductions in demand (5 to 15 per cent) 
could be achieved through either modest price increases or public information campaigns, while 
large reductions require substantial price increases or mandatory water restrictions.  
 
Mansur and Olmstead (2006) used daily household consumption data separated into indoor and 
outdoor use from 11 urban areas in Canada and the United States over a two-week period in a dry, 
and also a wet season. They found that indoor consumption appears to be affected only by income 
and family size while outdoor use is price elastic during the wet season and price inelastic in the 
dry season. In their study, they separated households based on their household lot size and income 
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level and found that households with the largest incomes and lot sizes have the least price elastic 
outdoor demand, while households with the lowest incomes and smallest lots are the most price 
elastic. Using their demand estimates they imposed a restriction that households could only water 
twice-per-week and calculated the shadow price for marginal units of restricted water. They found 
that the average household shadow price for marginal units of water with a twice-per-week water 
restriction was about three times higher than what households actually paid for their water. The 
implication of their simulations is that there exist substantial gains from adopting price-based 
approaches to regulate water demand versus the use of outdoor water restrictions.  
 
(iii) Australian Studies 
A number of studies have examined the issues of urban water pricing in Australia (Barrett 2004; 
Sibly 2006a), but only a handful have tried to estimate the welfare costs of water restrictions. 
Gordon et al. (2001) undertook a choice modeling survey with 294 Canberra residents in the late 
1990s to compare alternative supply and demand responses to water scarcity. They found that, on 
average, respondents were prepared to pay $150 to reduce water demand by 20% through the use of 
voluntary measures and incentives for recycling rather than be faced with 20% reduction in use 
from mandatory water restrictions. Hensher et al. (2006) also used a choice modelling approach in 
Canberra to calculate the marginal willingness to pay to avoid drought-induced restrictions. Their 
study was conducted in 2002 and 2003 and was based on 240 residential and 240 business 
respondents in Canberra. They found that residential respondents were unwilling to pay to avoid 
Stage One or Two restrictions (Stage One = limit the use of sprinklers to morning or evening; Stage 
Two = use sprinklers up to three hours in morning or evening). They provide two possible 
explanations for this result. First, respondents may feel a ‘warm glow’ about using water 
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responsibly that might offset their change in watering practices. Second, households might also be 
able to adapt relatively easily to Stage One and Stage Two water restrictions. Respondents, 
however, were willing to pay to avoid Stage Three restrictions (use of sprinklers not permitted and 
hand held hoses and buckets only permitted in morning and evening), but only if the restriction 
lasted all year. Their point estimate for the marginal willingness to pay of respondents to shift from 
Stage Three restrictions every day for a year to no restrictions was $239.  
 
Brennan et al. (2007) employed a household production function and experimental studies on lawns 
in Perth over three consecutive summers to calibrate a model of the time required to maintain a 
lawn. In their study, bans on the use of sprinklers can be substituted by household labour through 
the use of hand-held hoses or watering from buckets. Time spent watering by hand, however, 
reduces time for leisure activities that can be priced and, thus, the welfare costs of water restrictions 
can be calculated. They estimated that the per household welfare loss of a twice-per-week limit on  
the use of sprinklers costs about $100 per summer, while a complete ban on sprinklers generates 
costs from $347 to $870.  
 
As far as we aware there are no published studies that calculate the welfare costs of water 
restrictions using actual water demands in Australia. Indeed, we know of no published study 
anywhere that has calculated the actual consumer loss for an entire community associated with 
mandatory water restrictions. Using aggregate daily consumption for Sydney, the volumetric water 
price paid by households and rainfall and temperature data we estimate the price elasticity of 
demand. This estimated demand is used to calculate the difference in aggregate Marshallian surplus 
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from the imposition of mandatory water restrictions that actually occurred to what it would have 
been had the volumetric price of water been raised to ensure the same level of consumption.  
 
III Estimating an Aggregate Water Demand 
 
Sibly (2006b) describes the potential welfare costs of using mandatory water restrictions instead of 
higher volumetric prices. These costs arise from an inability of households to equate the marginal 
cost of water to its marginal benefit in use. As a result, households who are willing to pay more for 
their water to satisfy particular uses, such as outdoor watering, are unable to do so, at least via the 
existing water distribution network. We provide estimates of this welfare loss by estimating an 
aggregate daily water demand for Sydney. Given that water, on average, represents a tiny fraction 
of household income the estimated demand (Marshallian) can be interpreted as a marginal value 
curve associated with water use and can be used to calculate differences in welfare.5 
  
Using daily data on water consumption, maximum daily temperature, rainfall and an allowance for 
water restrictions we estimate a per capita aggregate water demand for Sydney. We hypothesise 
that demand is a function of real residential water prices, temperature (current and lagged), rainfall 
(current and lagged), and water restrictions. The chosen sample period used to estimate the water 
demand is from 1 January 1994 to 30 September 2005 which coincides with a single–tariff, but 
variable volumetric water price.  To account for the water restrictions that occurred from November 
1994 to October 1996, and introduced again in October 2003, we include two dummy variables as 
shift parameters. The difference in the demand estimates with and without the most recent water 
restrictions provides the basic framework for the welfare analysis.  
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 The results of the estimation are summarised in Table 1.  All coefficients are statistically different 
from zero at the one per cent level significance.  The estimated real price elasticity is -0.17 is less 
than that estimated by Grafton and Kompas (2007), but they use a smaller sample and do not 
include lagged (daily) values of temperature and rainfall. It is reasonable to expect that the price 
elasticity will be greater in the periods without water restrictions and we test for this difference. 
However, equality of the price elasticities estimates (with and without water restrictions) cannot be 
rejected and, thus, we use a single elasticity coefficient in the final and reported regression.  The 
dummy variable imposed for water restrictions since 1 October 2003 indicates that the restrictions 
have resulted in about a 14 per cent decline in aggregate water consumption compared to what 
would have occurred without restrictions. The results also show that warmer weather and lower 
rainfall both increase the aggregate demand for water. 
 
IV Marshallian Surplus: Prices versus Water Restrictions 
 
The demand estimates in Table One can be used to assess the welfare costs of restrictions. We 
estimate these costs by picking a given 12 month period for which we have rainfall and temperature 
data, water restrictions and a single water tariff. The chosen period for the analysis is 1 June 2004 
through to 1 June 2005. Our estimates should be interpreted as indicative of the loss in Marshallian 
surplus from mandatory water restrictions rather than a precise calculation of the loss for the 
chosen period.  To calculate the annual demand we use the actual rainfall and temperature data for 
2004/2005 period which we substitute into our estimated demand model and multiply per-capita 
quantity by population and then sum over all observations.   
 7
 The total water demand estimate is  in kilolitres (kL) calculated without 
the dummy for water restrictions imposed since 1 October 2003 and includes all types of water use 
(indoor and outdoor). The estimated demand for indoor use ⎯ what might also be called 
unrestricted uses in the sense that water for this purpose is not regulated by mandatory restrictions 
is  in kL. It is calculated with the dummy variable for water restrictions 
since 1 October 2003. The estimated demand for the restricted activities affected by the mandatory 
water restrictions, namely outdoor use, is the difference between the two demands and is 
 kL, at least for the observed price range.  
8 0.17( ) 6.12 10Tq p p−= ×
8 0.17( ) 5.30 10uq p p−= ×
7 0.17( ) ( ) ( ) 8.28 10r T Uq p q p q p p−= − = ×
 
Given there is a substitute for water supplied to households by Sydney Water — rain water 
tanks — there is some cut-off or choke price beyond which households are, in the long run, likely 
to switch to installing a rainwater tank. Using data and calculations that Marsden Jacob Associates 
(2007) undertook for the National Water Commission, we apply a choke price equal to $5.05/kL 
when outdoor water use becomes zero.6 If the cost of water provided by Sydney Water to 
households were higher than the average cost of water obtained from rainwater tanks then we 
assume that households would be able to substitute into water tanks to help meet their outdoor 
demand. Because it is a long-term adjustment and investment, some households with a marginal 
value of outdoor water above this cut-off price during the restriction period may not have installed 
rainwater tanks. In this case, our estimate of the welfare estimate of the restrictions will be a 
conservative understatement. 
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(i) Reallocation in Water Uses 
Our welfare analysis takes total water consumption as fixed, and analyses the benefit of 
reallocation of water between unrestricted (indoor) and restricted uses (outdoor). Our study is a 
macro analysis and thus we do not consider the micro or individual household issues associated 
with water conservation that are addressed elsewhere (Troy and Randolph 2006). 
 
Our first step is to find the market-clearing price *p  which, absent restrictions, would induce 
demand to equal to what actually occurred with Level Two mandatory water restrictions. The 
actual volumetric price of water from 1 July 2004 was $1.01/kL until a two-part tariff was 
introduced on 1 October 2005. The market-clearing price *p  can be approximated by 
 which equals $2.35/kL.  This is illustrated in Figure One by the market-clearing 
price that ensures the hypothetical or counter-factual water demand generates the identical water 
consumption as the actual demand. 
*( ) (1.01)T uq p q=
 
To calculate the welfare loss from reducing unrestricted (indoor) uses associated with a rise in price 
we integrate the inverse demand curve ( )up q between $1.01/kL and /kL. The loss in 
Marshallian surplus associated with this price change is calculated as follows: 
* $2.35p =
(2.35) 8
(1.01)
( ) 1.12 10
u
u
q u
q
p q dq = ×∫          (1) 
To calculate the benefit of reallocating water from unrestricted or indoor use to outdoor use we 
assume that the demand for outdoor use is truncated to zero above the choke price of $5.05/kL. The 
Marshallian surplus associated with the reallocation includes two parts: 
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(5.05)
(5.05) 8
(1.01)
(1.01)
( ) 5.05 (5.05) 3.47 10
r
r
r
r
q
q r r r
q
q
p q dq q p dq= + =∫ ∫ ×      (2) 
The difference between the loss from eliminating water restrictions and using a market-clearing 
price estimated in (1), and the estimated benefit from reallocation of water from indoor to outdoor 
uses in (2), yields a positive Marshallian surplus of  that equals $235 million. This is 
illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 2 and represents the net gain in reallocating water from 
indoor use with the actual demand under water restrictions to outdoor use with the hypothetical 
demand (outdoor use = hypothetical – actual demand) at the market-clearing price /kL. 
The extra revenue received by Sydney by using a price approach is not considered part of the 
welfare analysis as this could be returned to consumers via lump sum payments or lower fixed 
charges for water and possibly sewerage without losing the efficiency gains associated with a 
higher volumetric price.7  
82.35 10×
* $2.35p =
(ii) Welfare Costs of Water Tanks 
To obtain a full measure of the costs of water restrictions we must also add the extra costs of water 
tanks that consumers have bought to offset mandatory water restrictions. According to the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007) a total of 30,100 rainwater tanks were installed in Sydney 
since 2001. While we do not have information on the type of water tanks installed per household, a 
common type is a 2 kL tank adjoined to a 50 square metre roof. An estimate of the expected annual 
yield from such a tank is 40 kL per year (Marsden Jacob Associates 2007) that generates a 
‘levelised cost’ per kL of $5.05 or an average cost of $202 per year.  Thus the annual financial cost 
of all tanks is estimated to be 30,100 × 202 = $6.2 million.  However, the tanks also produce an 
average 30,100 × 40kL = 1.2 million kL, or less than 0.3% of annual demand.  This small amount 
of water could have been provided at the market-clearing price of water if they had been no water 
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restrictions at a cost of $2.8 million per year.8 Thus, the welfare loss from rainwater tanks is about 
$3.4 million if they were purchased to overcome water restrictions. Adding this avoidable 
annualized net loss of $3.4 million to the $235 million gain in Marshallian surplus from charging 
/kL, we derive a total benefit from prices versus rationing equal to $238 million. * $2.35p =
(iii) Sensitivity Analysis 
Our estimates are based on statistical data and thus are subject to errors. Given that our welfare 
measures are non-linear combinations of the estimated coefficients, the standard errors are difficult 
to compute directly. Thus we construct our confidence interval for the estimated Marshallian 
surplus by using the method of Krinsky and Robb (1986) who used simulations to generate 
intervals associated with a Wald statistic.  Using this approach, the 95% confidence interval for the 
point estimate of the net gain in Marshallian surplus from using the market-clearing price is $196 
million to $252 million. 
 
Our estimates of the Marshallian surplus from using volumetric prices to reduce demand are 
sensitive to both the choke price we use and the estimate price elasticity. Table two provides 
estimates of the market-clearing price, *p  for different choke prices ($/kL) and price elasticities. 
Table three provides a comparison of the Marshallian surplus for different choke prices and price 
elasticities. Although there is a large range in the welfare costs of water restrictions depending on 
the chosen values, in all cases the costs are substantial with a minimum value of about $36 million 
and a maximum value of $362 million.  
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(iv)  Discussion 
Our findings concur with those of Hensher et al. (2006) and Brennan et al. (2007) that the welfare 
costs of permanent and high level mandatory water restrictions can be very large. Indeed, our 
analysis of the welfare costs are likely a lower bound of the costs of water restrictions as we do not 
consider the loss of leisure time from hand watering, nor do we account for non-household losses 
such as those associated with bans on the use of public ovals. Notwithstanding the possibility of 
accessing increasing supplies from rural areas (Quiggin 2006), desalination or recycling it would 
seem that water utilities, such as Sydney Water, should consider alternative approaches to manage 
low water supplies. In particular, they should use higher volumetric prices coupled with lower fixed 
charges (both water charges and sewerage charges) to balance supply and demand.9 
 
V Concluding Remarks 
 
In response to a low rain fall period over the past six years or so in south east Australia urban water 
utilities have employed mandatory water restrictions to help balance demand with dwindling 
supplies. As of October 2007, these restrictions are in force in all major urban centres in mainland 
Australia with the exception of Darwin. Indeed, in some locations mandatory water restrictions 
have been in place for several years and are becoming a permanent feature of urban life. Such an 
approach to managing water demand is not economically efficient and can impose substantial 
welfare losses. This is because households who are willing to pay more for water to satisfy 
particular uses, such as outdoor watering, are unable to do so through the existing water supply 
network.  
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Using daily water consumption data, real volumetric water prices and daily maximum water 
temperatures and daily rainfall data we are able to calculate an aggregate per capita water demand 
for Sydney for the period 1994 to 2005. The estimated demand is used to calculate the difference in 
Marshallian surplus between using the metered price of household water to regulate total 
consumption versus mandatory water restrictions for the period 2004/2005. Using the point 
estimate for the price elasticity of demand and a choke price of $5.05/kL, we calculate the loss in 
Marshallian surplus from using mandatory water restrictions in Sydney to be about $235 million 
over a 12 month period in 2004/2005. On a per capita basis this equates to approximately $55 
person or about $150 per household — a little less than half the average Sydney household water 
bill in 2005.  
 
Our findings suggest that mandatory water restrictions in urban Australia should be removed and 
the volumetric price of water increased to regulate water demand when required. To address equity 
concerns, the increase in revenue from higher prices could be returned to households in the form of 
lump sum payments through a lower, or even zero fixed charges. Such an approach to managing 
urban water demand offers the promise of large gains in welfare relative to the traditional approach 
of rationing water in periods of low rainfall. 
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Table One: Parameter Estimates of an Aggregate Per Capita Water Demand in Sydney (1 
January 1994 to 30 September 2005) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic 
Constant -2.0363      0.0042 -48.967 
Real Price (ln) -0.1725       0.0293 -5.892 
Maximum 
Temperature (current 
period) 
0.1272   0.0094 13.450 
Maximum 
Temperature (lagged 
period) 
0.2286 0.0095 23.967 
Rain (current period) -0.0010  0.0001   -8.881 
Rain (lagged period) -0.0013 0.0001 -8.865 
Dummy One (water 
restrictions in 1995) 
 -0.0834     0.0096 -8.752 
Dummy Two (water 
restrictions since 1 
October 2003) 
-0.1453 0.0133 -10.937 
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Table Two: The Market Clearing Price ($/kL) with Different Choke Prices and Price 
Elasticities 
 
 
 Choke Price ($/kL) 
Elasticity 3 4 5 6 7 
 -0.5 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10  
-0.40 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22  
-0.30 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44  
-0.20 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00  
-0.10 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.39 5.39  
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Table Three: Net Gain in Marshallain Surplus ($ millions) from Using a Market Clearing 
Price versus Water Restrictions with Different Choke Prices and Price Elasticities 
 
 
 Choke Price ($/kL) 
Elasticity 3 4 5 6 7 
 -0.5 35.8 49.8 62.2 73.6 84.2  
-0.40 61.5 87.7 111.4 133.4 154.0  
-0.30 87.1 128.9 167.6 204.2 239.0  
-0.20 103.5 165.0 223.6 279.8 334.3  
-0.10 64.0 126.4 199.7 281.0 362.2  
 
Notes: 
1. The Marshallian surplus does not include the annual cost associated with the use of water tanks.
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Figure 1: Actual and Hypothetical Water Demand for Sydney 1 June 2004 to 1 June 2005
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Figure 2: Actual and Outdoor (Hypothetical less Actual) Water Demand for Sydney 1 June 
2004 to 1 June 2005
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End Notes 
 
1. This century mandatory water restrictions in Sydney began on 1 October 2003 when Level One 
restrictions were imposed. Level 2 restrictions were implemented on 1 June 2004 and Level Three 
restrictions have been in place since 1 June 2005. 
 
2. Mandatory water restrictions have been in place, in one form or another, in Canberra since 
December 2002, in Sydney since October 2003, in Melbourne since November 2002, in Brisbane 
since May 2005, in Adelaide since 2002 and Perth since last century. 
 
3.  On average, households in Australia consume a little less than 700 litres per day. For a four 
person household this equates to about 170 liters per person per day. 
 
4. See Troy and Randolph (2006) for a useful discussion on differences in water consumption by 
household characteristics and attitudes to water consumption in Sydney. 
 
5. Household water expenditures (including sewerage charges) cost, respectively, the average 
household in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane $747, $537 and $722 in 2005 (Australian Water 
Association 2007). 
 
6. The $5.05/kL price is based on the assumption households can use a roof of  50 square metres to 
catch the rain and install a 2kL water tank (Marsden Jacob associates 2007, p. 24). Alternative 
prices per kL from a water tank can be calculated depending on the assumptions used about roof 
size, plumbing and pumping costs and the size of the tank. 
 
7. Our demand estimates are based on total water usage, but some of this is lost in the system to 
leaks and seepage and non-household uses, for which we have no separate data. However, 
assuming non-household losses are constant and insensitive to price, correcting for these losses 
would simply shift both the actual and hypothetical demand curves to the left by this amount. The 
area between the demands, and thus our estimates of Marshallian surplus, would be unchanged.  
 
8. If a more substantial amount of water were provided by water tanks we would need to recalculate 
the market-clearing price that would generate the same level of water consumption as Level Two 
mandatory water restrictions. 
 
9. In 2004/2005 in Sydney, fixed water charges per household were $77.62 and fixed sewerage 
charges per household were $346.66. Thus the rebates proposed from using a market-clearing price 
would lower the overall water and sewerage fixed charges but they would still remain positive. 
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